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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the price of a single brand in the bottled water industry.  We find that the brand's 
(. 
price is negatively related to its own share.  We also find that price is positively related to the four firm 
concentration ratio in the carbonated segment, but unrelated in the noncarbonated segment. This paper analyzes the performance of a single brand in the bottled water industry.  The brand 
studied is Poland Spring, which ranks among the top  10 brands (by volume) in both the carbonated and 
noncarbonated segments  of the  industry.  Its  manufacturer,  Source Perrier S A,  was  the third largest 
vendor of bottled water at the end of 1992.  This study uses quarterly data extracted from Information 
Resources,  Inc. 's (lRI)  InfoScan data base for the period beginning with the first quarter of 1988 and 
ending with the fourth quarter 1992 
Bottled water first gained popularity in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In 
the  late  1970s,  bottled water began to  appear in bars and  on the tables  of restaurants in metropolitan 
areas.  Since  that  time  consumers  have  increasingly  used  bottled  water  as  an  accompaniment  to  or 
substitute for wine at mealtime (Beverage Marketing).  Throughout the 1980s, it was the fastest growing 
segment of the beverage industry, experiencing double-digit growth throughout the decade. 
Because of its rapid growth, the industry remains highly fragmented,  with many small regional 
brands  trying  to  establish  a  foothold  in  what  is  characterized  as  a  "lucrative  market"  (Beverage 
Marketing).  In addition to pure price competition, firms competing for market share in this industry are 
using a good deal of non-price competition,  including advertising and product differentiation via brand 
names.  Industry analysts predict that  "competition will be greater and the prices lower"  in the future 
(Beverage Marketing). 
The first section of this paper extends oligopoly theory to show the relationship between the price 
a dominant firm charges and  its  market share and market conditions in a differentiated goods industry. 
The second section develops an estimatable model of price in the bottled water industry and discusses the 
data and methodology used.  Third, we present the results of our estimations, and finally, we discuss and 
draw conclusions from the results. 
Theoretical Development 
Our formal analysis of the differentiated product dominant firm model! begins with the dominant 
1 firm's profit function: 
where  qi  = q[Q(Pi" ")'  qR(Pi" ")'  PR(Pi"")]  is firm i's perceived demand, 
Q  =  qi  +  qR  is  total industry output, 
qR  is the sum of all  rivals' output quantities, and 
P  R  is  the rivals' price response function2. 
(1) 
The first-order condition for profit maximization in the Bertrand (price setting) model, in terms of firm 
i's price, marginal cost, and own-price elasticity of demand,  ,,/ : 
dn. 
dP:  = -(Pi  - MC)"i  +  Pi  = 0  . 
Using the fact that  qi  =  q[Q(Pi" ")'  qR(Pi" ")'  PR(Pi" ")] , we can express "i as 
"M  +  e(l-s) - "C"R Si 
_ aQ Pi  where  11M  =  > 0 is the price elasticity of market demand, 
api  Q 
e  aqR  Pi  >  O·  h  .  I  .  I  . .  f '  I '  I  =  - - <  IS  t  e conJectura  own-pnce e aStICIty  0  nva s  supp y, 
api  qR 
aqi  PR  - - ~ 0 is the cross-price elasticity of own-firm demand,  and 
aPR  qi 
R  aPR  Pi  > o·  th  .  al' al  .  I  . .  "  = - - <  IS  e conJectur  nv  pnce response e astlCIty. 
api  PR 
Substituting this into equation (2)  and solving for Pi yields: 
"i  "M  +  e(l  - s.)  - "C"RS . 
Pi  =  MCi-- - Me.  I  I 
"i  - 1  I  "M  +  e(l  - s) - "C"RSi  - Si 
The derivative of equation (6) with respect to  market share is 
api  =  MC.  "M  + e 





This derivative will be positive unless e <  0 (firm i's conjecture is that rivals will respond to a price cut 
by increasing their own output) and  Ie I > "M  (firm i's conjecture is that rivals will expand their output 
2 by more than the total increase in market demand resulting from its price cut) (Harris, p.  274).  In the 
case of constant costs, a firm's price is a positive function of its market share.  In the event of a marginal 
cost decrease, price also decreases.  If  the decrease in marginal cost increases market share, then one has 
an ambiguous price result. 
Development of the Empirical Model 
The theoretical model must be expanded to reflect institutional realities in the particular industry 
studied and the panel nature of the data set.  The data set  is  three dimensional in nature - it contains 
observations  across  up  to  22  markets  for  a time  period of twenty  quarters.  In  addition,  it  contains 
observations for  both carbonated and  noncarbonated  water.  To  address  this  last dimension,  we  will 
assume that the structural variables affect both segments equally, and that only the relationship between 
market share and price differs for the two segments. 
The dependent variable used is the Average Price per volume equivalent.  The industry standard 
"volume equivalent"  in soft drinks and bottled water is  traditionally 192 ounces, an amount equal to a 
case of 8 ounce bottles.  The Average Price is the average price paid by consumers for the quarter, net 
of all discounts except manufacturers' coupons. 
We use two alternative variables to examine the effects of share on price.  The Volume Share 
is the quantity of Poland Spring sold during the quarter divided by the total quantity of all brands of car-
bonated and noncarbonated water sold in the market that quarter.  Theory developed above,  as  well  as 
previous empirical findings (e.g., Wills), leads us to expect a positive relationship between volume share 
and price.  As an alternative specification, we replace market share with Brand CR4•  Brand C~  is con-
structed for each market by summing the market shares of the four leading brands in that market for the 
quarter.  Previous empirical studies (e.g., Cotterill, Weiss) have found a positive relation between con-
centration and price.  We therefore expect to find a positive relationship between concentration and price. 
We use Private Label Price as an instrument for the unobservable marginal cost.  Connor and 
Peterson argue that private label price represents the "competitive" price in a market since private label 
3 goods  are  not  promoted  and  are produced  under contract to  retailer specifications  that usually  copy 
leading brand ingredients,  flavors,  etc.  Private label  price effectively equals marginal  cost.  Higher 
private label prices merely reflect a higher cost of doing business in a given market and therefore prices 
for branded products should also be higher.  The private label price represents the average price for all 
store brands offered by retailers in the market area. 
We include two demographic variables that act as demand shifters.  The Population of the market 
area is  included to examine the effect of market size.  If  there are increasing economies of scale in the 
range of market sizes in this sample, population should have a negative influence on price.  However, 
if firms  incur higher costs in larger markets, these markets should have higher prices.  This variable is 
constant over a calendar year and is obtained from Market Profiles, provided by IRI, supplemented with 
Progressive Grocer's Market Scope. 
Median Family Income can be considered a proxy for wage costs in the market, and so represent 
a cost of doing business for the retailer.  Second, assuming that bottled water is  a normal good, rising 
income will increase demand  and,  ceteris paribus, price.  Median Family Income  is  constant over a 
calendar year and its source is Market Scope. 
The Volume per Unit variable is included to control for the lower prices charged per ounce for 
water sold in larger "economy" size containers, such as two liter bottles.  It is  constructed by dividing 
number of 192 oz. "volume equivalents" sold within a market by the total number of units (12 oz. cans, 
one liter bottles, etc.) sold.  Unless consumers actually pay more per ounce for larger sizes, this variable 
should have a negative sign. 
The basic models we will estimate are 
Price  = P1D1  +  f32D2  +  f3 3 (Dl  *StructureVar)  +  f3 4 (D2  * StructureVar)  + 
f3 5 PvtLabelPr  +  f3 6 Median Income  +  f3 7 Population  +  f3 8 VolPerUnit 
where  Structure Var is  either Market Share or Brand C~ ; 
Dl is  equal to one if the observation is for carbonated Poland Spring, zero otherwise; and 
D2  is  equal to  one if the observation is  for noncarbonated Poland Spring, zero otherwise. 
4 Results 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the data used in our estimations.  As  can be seen, the 
mean price for carbonated water is more than twice that for noncarbonated water.  This price difference 
is  not unique  to  Poland Spring.  In  the  fourth  quarter of 1992,  for  example,  the  mean price for  all 
carbonated water in the U.S. was $4.64, while the mean price for noncarbonated water was $1.52 (IRI). 
There are marked differences in market share as well; the mean local share for carbonated Poland Spring 
is  7.76 percent, while the mean local share for noncarbonated Poland Spring is  only 1.88 percent. 
In order to get a better feel for the data, let us  take a look at the data for Boston.  In Figures 1 
and 2, we see that in Boston Poland Spring's carbonated water reached a maximum market share of 3.88 
percent  and  a maximum  price per volume  $7.88.  For noncarbonated water  (Figures  3  and 4),  the 
maximum price is $1.95 and the maximum market share is 28.45 percent.  Note that over time price has 
dropped and market share has increased for carbonated water; with a significant price decrease in the first 
quarter of 1991 corresponding to a jump in its market share.  A similar price drop for its noncarbonated 
water did not produce a similar increase in market share.  This suggests that the two product markets are 
separate  and  that  there  may  be  different  relationships  between  price  and  market  share  in  the  two 
segments. 
The mean CRt is similar for the two segments.  Poland Spring's noncarbonated products are more 
widely distributed, however,  and  this  accounts  for the different means  for  CR4  and  for the following 
variables.  In  fact,  Poland  Spring's  noncarbonated  water  accounts  for  more  than  60  percent  more 
observations (302  VS.  182) than its carbonated products. 
The mean private label price was a little less than $1.50 for both segments, and the median family 
income averaged about $35,000.  Mean population for both segments  was  about 3.6 million,  which is 
larger than the mean population of 2.7 million for all IRI markets.  Poland Spring tends to be sold more 
in larger markets.  The mean of the Volume per Unit variable is quite different for the two segments. 
It  is  much  larger  for  the  noncarbonated  water  segment,  indicating  that  Poland  Spring  sells  its 
5 noncarbonated water in larger containers. 
Table 2 contains the results of our regressions.  Equation 1 contains the structural variable Market 
Share.  Overall, the model explains a high percentage of the variation in the price of Poland Spring, with 
an R2 of 0.819.  Market share is negative in both segments, and significant at the five percent level for 
the  carbonated  water  segment  and  significant  at  the  one  percent  level  for  the  noncarbonated  water 
segment.  This finding is in contradiction to the theory presented above; its implications will be discussed 
below.  The coefficient on carbonated water's market share is more than four times greater in magnitude 
than that for noncarbonated water, indicating that carbonated water faces  a much steeper demand curve. 
Private Label Price is  positive, as  hypothesized, and significant at the one percent level.  Private laDel 
price is  clearly a good indicator of costs in local markets. 
Larger markets have higher prices.  Population is positive and significant at the one percent level. 
The magnitude of the coefficient indicates a price spread between the smallest and largest markets in the 
sample of about 55 cents.  The coefficient for median family income is negative and significant at the one 
percent level.  This is in contradiction to our hypothesis that median income should serve as an instrument 
for labor costs and so carry a positive sign.  If  demand for bottled water is higher in higher income mar-
kets, this greater demand may attract entrants to these markets and increase competition, thereby lowering 
price.  Finally, the coefficient for the volume per unit variable is  negative,  as  hypothesized, and sig-
nificant at the one percent level.  Consumers who purchase water in larger sized bottles do save money. 
Turning to equation 2 containing brand level CRt as the structural variable, we again see a high 
level of explanatory power, with an R2  of 0.814.  In this case, we see that CRt is positive, as hypothe-
sized, and significant at the five percent level for carbonated water, but it is  not significant for noncar-
bonated water.  This indicates that market power is  being exercised in the carbonated water segment, 
providing a price umbrella for all brands, but not in the noncarbonated segment. 
The remaining variables perform much as  they did much in equation 1, except that the signifi-
cance level of the coefficient for population drops to  the five percent level and the significance of the 
6 coefficient for median family  income drops to the ten percent level. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The finding of a significant negative relationship between market share and price, in contradiction 
of our hypothesis, merits some discuSSlOn.  Haller (1994), modelling brand price in the catsup industry, 
finds  that the relationship between share and price when viewed in an interbrand context (Heinz' share 
vs. Hunts' share)  is  positive, but the relationship turns negative when viewed in an intrabrand context 
(variations  in  Heinz'  share  across  markets  or  over  time).  The  negative  intrabrand  relationship  is 
determined by the short-run demand effects of price changes.  Higher share brands do have, on average, 
higher prices but demand effects trace a negative relationship around the higher mean price. 
We  find  evidence  that  market  power  is  being  exercised  and  price  levels  increased  in  more 
concentrated markets, at least in the carbonated water segment.  Poland Springs is not frequently in the 
top four brands in the local markets it competes in, so it appears that it is following the price leadership 
of the top  selling brands.  There is  no  evidence to  support a similar conclusion in the noncarbonated 
segment.  Indeed, this segment appears to be effectively competitive. 
Private label  price is  an excellent predictor of price and,  following  Connor and  Peterson,  an 
excellent instrument for  marginal cost.  We  also  fmd  that prices are higher in larger markets, but we 
cannot determine from this data whether this  is  due to diseconomies of size (greater amounts of inputs 
necessary to deliver the same output) or merely due to higher input costs (the same amount of inputs at 
higher prices to deliver the same output), or both.  Finally, we find  that it is  important to control for 
package size when modelling price for retail packaged food products, and that consumers do save money 
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9 Table 1  Descriptive Statistics for Poland Spring: First Quarter 1988 - Fourth Quarter 1992 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Carbonated Water Segment (n  = 182) 
Average Price  $5.85  1.12  $4.30  $9.56 
Volume Share  1.88  1.41  0.50  7.42 
Brand CR4  36.83  10.20  12.8  76.2 
Private Label Price  $1.45  1.02  0.0  $3.69 
Population  3,630,000  3,920,000  924,000  15,700,000 
Median Family Income  $35,820  8,400  $20,730  $52,950 
Volume per Unit  0.163  0.0165  0.146  0.245 
Noncarbonated Water Segment (n  = 302) 
Average Price  $2.53  1.63  $1.23  $7.01 
Volume Share  7.76  7.91  0.52  28.45 
Brand CR4  39.86  10.23  12.8  77.8 
Private Label Price  $1.49  1.25  0.0  $9.48 
Population  3,630,000  3,690,000  740,000  15,700,000 
Median Family Income  $34,090  8,270  $20,730  $52,950 
Volume per Unit  0.56  0.21  0.15  0.91 
10 Table 2  Regression Results for Poland Spring Bottled Water 
Dependent Variable is  Average Price per Volume 
Equation 1 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient 
(t-ratio) 
Market Share  -0.112 
(Carbonated Segment)  (-2.02)"-
Market Share  -0.0273 





Private Label  0.204 
Price  (5.45)" 
Population  0.0371 
(Millions)  (3.10)" 
Median Family Income  -0.0137 
($Thousands)  (-2.56)"" 
Volume per  -6.059 
Unit  (-21.54)" 
Constant  7.11 
(Carbonated Segment) 
Constant  6.18 
(Noncarbonated Segment) 
R2  0.819 
Note: There are 534 observations. 
* Significant at 99%  level, **  Significant at 95%  level, 



















0.814 End Notes 
1.  For a more detailed derivation, see Haller (1994). 
2. All rivals are assumed to be characterized by a single price response function,  making this in effect 
a 2 firm model.  The model  can be fully  generalized to  n firms  by incorporating n  - 1 distinct price 
response functions. 
3.  Throughout this paper we will follow the convention of considering the price elasticities of demand 
to  be positive numbers; for instance, firm i's own-price elasticity of demand  is  given by: 
dqi Pi 
TJi  = -
dPi  qi 
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